Official Committe v. Westmorelandd Cty by unknown
1999 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-19-1999 
Official Committe v. Westmorelandd Cty 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999 
Recommended Citation 
"Official Committe v. Westmorelandd Cty" (1999). 1999 Decisions. 206. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999/206 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1999 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed July 19, 1999 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS 
OF LIFE SERVICE SYSTEMS, INC., 




WESTMORELAND COUNTY MH/MR 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 97-cv-01852) 
District Judge: Honorable William L. Standish 
 
Argued February 8, 1999 
 
Before: SLOVITER, ROTH and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 19, 1999) 
 
       F. Scott Gray 
       Thomas M. Ferguson (Argued) 
       Sable, Makoroff & Gusky 
       Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 
        Attorneys for Appellant 
 
       K. Lawrence Kemp (Argued) 
       Kemp & Kemp 
       New Kensington, PA 15068 
 




OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
In January 1997, Life Service Systems, Inc. ("LSS") filed 
a petition for voluntary bankruptcy under Chapter 11. LSS 
provided mental health services under contract with the 
Westmoreland County Mental Health and Mental 
Retardation Program (the "County"), a county-created 
agency fulfilling the state-imposed obligation to address the 
needs of the mentally ill population. 
 
Before us is the appeal of the Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors of Life Service Systems, Inc. (the 
"Creditors"), from the decision by the District Court holding 
that LSS's title to certain assets divested to the County 
upon the termination of the contract between them. 
Although the parties have briefed the merits of the appeal, 




Beginning in 1988, the County entered into a series of 
identically worded, one-year contracts with LSS (or its 
predecessor) to provide mental health services. Rather than 
paying LSS on a fee-for-service basis, the County agreed to 
reimburse LSS for its expenses and LSS could retain a 
portion of its revenues up to a specified maximum. 
Permissible expenditures for which it was reimbursed 
included the purchase of fixed assets, which the contract 
defined as items costing at least $500 and either having an 
expected useful life exceeding one year or being repeatedly 
usable without material impairment of their physical 
condition. 
 
The contract provided that "[t]itle to allfixed assets 
purchased in whole or in part with funds from this 
Agreement . . . shall vest during the term of this Agreement 
in [LSS] and shall automatically divest upon the 
termination or cancellation of the Agreement and vest with 
County." App. at 118. In accordance with this title clause, 
LSS was prohibited during the term of the agreement or 
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within ninety days after its termination or cancellation from 
selling, leasing, donating, or otherwise disposing of fixed 
assets purchased with funds under the agreement without 
County approval. The contract further provided that, upon 
its expiration, the County could exercise one of three 
options regarding the assets: 
 
        A. Take possession of said fixed assets and 
       reimburse any other funding sources according to their 
       percentage contribution based upon fair market value 
       as determined by an independent appraisal; 
 
        B. Direct that said fixed assets be sold pur suant to 
       an independent appraisal reflecting an acceptable fair 
       market value in accordance with [State law] with the 
       proceeds of the sale retained by the County; 
 
        C. Allow retention by [LSS] upon proport ionate 
       payment to the County of the share contributed by the 
       County as determined by the fair market value in 
       accordance with an independent appraiser. . . . 
 
App. at 118-19; see 55 Pa. Code S 4300.106(c). 
 
Despite the contract's procedure for divesting title, 
Pennsylvania regulations governing the provision of mental 
health services state that, "[i]f the provider holds title to the 
asset, the provider may pledge the assets as collateral for 
loans necessary to the agency." 55 Pa. Code S 4300.106(d). 
Consequently, LSS obtained three loans for building 
renovations in 1995 from National City Bank of 
Pennsylvania (the "Bank"), and used some of the fixed 
assets for collateral, as a result of which the Bank 
possesses an undisputed security interest in existing and 
future-acquired equipment. 
 
At the time LSS filed for bankruptcy in January 1997, it 
was in the middle of its contract with the County, which 
was due to expire June 30, 1997. LSS continued to provide 
services to the County under the contract as a debtor in 
possession. The County elected to end the contractual 
relationship with LSS at the conclusion of that term, 
terminated the agreement as of June 1997, and contracted 
with another company to provide the services LSS had 
provided. The County filed a Motion for Relief From Stay 
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later that same month, by which it sought a determination 
that title to certain fixed assets is now vested in the County 
and sought their possession. Both the Bank and the 
Creditors objected. 
 
After a hearing on the motion, the Bankruptcy Courtfirst 
concluded that although LSS had title to the fixed assets at 
the time of filing, that title was divested after June 30, 
1997, when the contract terminated. It held that section 
541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code1 does not give the estate 
more than the debtor had at the time of the filing, which, 
in this case, was title that would divest upon the 
termination of the agreement. The court next held that the 
County did not have a "secured" interest in the fixed assets 
within the contemplation of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
because the purpose of vesting "title" in thefixed assets in 
the County was not to secure payment or performance of 
any obligation owed to the County but to ensure that the 
fixed assets were available for use by any other provider of 
the necessary mental health services with whom the 
County might contract in the future. The Bankruptcy Court 
finally concluded that the Bank could enforce its perfected 
security interest against the County, so the County would 
receive the fixed assets subject to that interest. 
 
Both the Creditors and the County appealed to the 
District Court, invoking jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 158(a) for review of what the District Court termed a "final 
order." 
 
On the Creditors' appeal, the District Court distinguished 
between the status of the fixed assets listed in the Fixed 
Asset Ledger and the status of the motor vehicles listed in 
the Motor Vehicle chart of the same exhibit. As to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 541(a)(1) provides: 
 
       (a) The commencement of a case under section 3 01, 302, or 303 of 
       this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the 
       following property, wherever located and by whomever held: 
 
       (1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this 
section, 
       all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of 
the 
       commencement of the case. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 541(a)(1). 
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former, the court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's 
determination that, at the termination of the contract, title 
in the property which had been purchased with contract 
funds vested in the County. As to the motor vehicles, the 
District Court concluded that there was a question of fact 
as to whether those motor vehicles were in fact purchased 
with funds received from the contract or with other funds. 
Therefore, the court remanded the case to the Bankruptcy 
Court for further proceedings, including an evidentiary 
hearing on that issue. 
 
On the County's appeal with respect to the order 
regarding the Bank's rights as to the fixed assets, the 
District Court rejected the County's arguments and agreed 
with the Bankruptcy Court's disposition that the Bank had 
an enforceable security interest. In conclusion, the District 
Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision for the 
most part and remanded for factual findings regarding 
whether the motor vehicles were purchased in whole or in 
part with the County's funds. 
 
The Creditors, but not the County, appeal. The Creditors 
argue that both the Bankruptcy Court and the District 
Court erred in "failing to consider the status of LSS as 
debtor and trustee as a hypothetical lien creditor under 11 
U.S.C. S 544(a)(1) and (2), with a judicial lien against all 
`fixed assets.' " Under 11 U.S.C. S 1107(a), the debtor in 
possession has almost all of the rights, powers, and duties 
of a trustee.2 The Creditors contend that it was error to 
hold that the debtor was divested of title in thefixed assets 
on termination of the contract. They also seek an 
evidentiary hearing on the County's interest in thefixed 
assets (in addition to the hearing ordered on the motor 
vehicles), i.e., whether the items listed were purchased in 




Although none of the parties has questioned our 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. At the outset of the bankruptcy, LSS continued its affairs as debtor in 
possession. However, by an order of November 7, 1997, a Chapter 11 
trustee was approved in the case. 
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jurisdiction to hear this appeal, we have an independent 
obligation to ensure that appellate jurisdiction is present. 
See F/S Airlease II, Inc. v. Simon, 844 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 
1988). 
 
Under 28 U.S.C. S 158(d), the courts of appeals have 
jurisdiction over appeals from "all final decisions, 
judgments, orders, and decrees entered" by a district court 
reviewing a bankruptcy court decision under 28 U.S.C. 
S 158(a). Generally speaking, "when the bankruptcy court 
issues what is indisputably a final order, and the district 
court issues an order affirming or reversing, the district 
court's order is also a final order." In re Porter, 961 F.2d 
1066, 1072 (3d Cir. 1992). However, where the district 
court does not merely affirm or reverse and instead 
remands the case to the bankruptcy court, the finality of 
the order is less clear. 
 
Most courts of appeals analyze the jurisdictionalfinality 
of a district court's remand by considering the bankruptcy 
court's responsibility on remand. See In re Lopez, 116 F.3d 
1191, 1192 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing cases from eight other 
circuits). If the bankruptcy court's actions will be"purely 
ministerial in character," such as computing prejudgment 
interest according to an undisputed rate and time period, 
then the remanded proceedings are unlikely to engender 
further appeals and the order is final. Id.  
 
This court has frequently noted that we have "taken a 
flexible, practical approach to interpreting thefinality 
requirement in bankruptcy cases." In re Blue Coal Corp., 
986 F.2d 687, 689 (3d Cir. 1993); accord F/S Airlease II, 
844 F.2d at 103 (describing a "more pragmatic and less 
technical way [of viewing finality] in bankruptcy cases than 
in other situations" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
This entails balancing "a general reluctance to expand 
traditional interpretations regarding finality and a desire to 
effectuate a practical termination of the matter before us." 
In re Meyertech Corp., 831 F.2d 410, 414 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
In In re Market Square Inn, Inc., 978 F.2d 116, 120 (3d 
Cir. 1992), we applied this flexible approach tofind 
appellate jurisdiction over the district court's order holding 
that a lease between the debtor and its landlord survived 
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after the filing of the bankruptcy. In so holding, we quoted 
from our earlier opinion in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. 
v. McCune, 836 F.2d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1987), where we 
noted that "bankruptcy cases `frequently involve protracted 
proceedings with many parties participating,' " and 
observed that, "[t]o avoid the waste of time and resources 
that might result from viewing discrete portions of the 
action only after a plan of reorganization is approved, 
courts have permitted appellate review of orders that in 
other contexts might be considered interlocutory." Id. at 
158 (quoting In Re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1039 (3d 
Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
We consider four factors to determine whether a district 
court's order is final and reviewable: "the impact upon the 
assets of the bankrupt estate, the necessity for further fact- 
finding on remand, the preclusive effects of our decision on 
the merits of further litigation, and whether the interest of 
judicial economy would be furthered." In re Blue Coal Corp., 
986 F.2d at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted). Of 
these, the "most important" factor is the impact on the 
assets of the estate. In re Market Square Inn, Inc., 978 F.2d 
at 120 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Our decision in F/S Airlease II is illustrative. In that 
case, a company that had leased back a Boeing airplane 
that it had previously sold to the lessor filed for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 844 F.2d at 
101. Some time thereafter, the bankruptcy court held a 
hearing and approved a lease of the airplane that had been 
negotiated by a broker. Seven months after that approval, 
the broker filed a motion for a nunc pro tunc appointment 
as broker, with an attendant claim for administrative 
expenses. The bankruptcy court approved the requests, but 
the district court affirmed only the appointment and 
remanded for substantiation of the requested expenses. The 
creditor appealed the appointment. Id. at 102-03. 
 
We considered, and upheld, our appellate jurisdiction. 
We noted that "the order has a significant impact on the 
assets of the estate" because the amount the broker sought 
constituted a "substantial portion" of the estate's assets, 
approval of the award to the broker would "severely affect 
the rights of other creditors," and "delay of the final 
 
                                7 
  
resolution of the matter could have an adverse impact on 
the debtor's successful reorganization." Id. at 104. Although 
the district court had remanded for further fact-finding, we 
held that did not affect our jurisdiction over the portion of 
its order approving the nunc pro tunc employment. The 
remand was only for the matter of the amount of the 
broker's compensation, and did not "relate[ ] to a central 
issue on appeal," the propriety of the retroactive 
appointment. Id. at 104 n.4 (quoting In re Stanton, 766 
F.2d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
 
Our primary inquiry, therefore, must be directed to the 
impact of the order at issue on the estate. In this case, the 
Creditors are appealing the District Court's determination 
that, at the termination of the County's contract with LSS, 
title in property which had been purchased with contract 
funds vested in the County. The issue that the District 
Court remanded to the Bankruptcy Court is whether the 
motor vehicles were also purchased with contract funds. At 
oral argument, we inquired of counsel for the Creditors 
regarding the potential impact on the estate, and counsel, 
rather than asserting that the impact on the estate would 
be substantial, candidly replied that the appeal was 
precautionary. Based on our review of this case, we cannot 
conclude that the impact on the estate will be substantial 
if the remand is completed before the issue of the County's 
title in the property is reviewed. 
 
Moreover, even if the furniture were not subject to the 
Bank's perfected security interest, this case differs from 
cases such as In re Market Square Inn, Inc. in which we 
took jurisdiction. In that case, the debtor's business had a 
chance of continuing in the reorganization only if the debtor 
retained the lease in question. 978 F.2d at 120-21. By 
contrast, here the County has awarded the mental health 
services contract to another entity and presumablyfiled its 
motion for relief from the stay so that the new contractor 
could employ those assets. Inasmuch as LSS no longer 
requires the assets in order to continue in its former 
business with the County, this case does not fall into the 
category of cases where an immediate appeal is necessary 
because of the impact of the District Court's ruling on the 
possibility of a viable reorganization. 
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Admittedly, were we to adopt the Creditors' argument, 
based on the scope of the power of a hypothetical judicial 
lien creditor under section 544, we would obviate the need 
for further fact-finding by the Bankruptcy Court. Yet the 
fact-finding that is the subject of the District Court's 
remand to the bankruptcy court requires more than a 
"purely ministerial" function. See, e.g., United States 
Trustee v. Gryphon at the Stone Mansion, Inc., 166 F.3d 
552, 556-57 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing In re Lopez, 116 F.3d 
1191, 1192 (7th Cir. 1997)). On the other hand, were we to 
decide the merits issue in favor of the County, we would 
not necessarily obviate further appeals following the 
bankruptcy court's determination of the County's share of 
the motor vehicle purchases, and the litigation could be 
protracted. 
 
Finally, it appears likely that our failure to decide the 
Creditors' appeal at this time will not prevent the 
reorganization from proceeding, if that is possible. Nor will 
it result in a waste of judicial time and resources. This is 
in sharp contrast to the decisions in which we upheld our 
jurisdiction. For example, in In re Market Square Inn, Inc. 
we observed that reversing the bankruptcy court's decision 
would foreclose any possible reorganization because the 
lease had a substantial impact on the estate and the debtor 
would be unable to obtain new financing for its business 
without the lease. 978 F.2d at 120-21. Similarly, in F/S 
Airlease we opined that the effect of failing to take 
jurisdiction at that stage could be to transform the Chapter 
11 reorganization into a Chapter 7 involuntary bankruptcy. 
F/S Airlease, 844 F.2d at 104. 
 
Here, the furniture remains subject to National City 
Bank's perfected security interest and will not be 
distributed to another creditor. Moreover, according to the 
County, only two parties have an interest in the motor 
vehicles. There is, therefore, a lesser danger of wasting the 
court's or the parties' time and resources if they move 
forward in the Bankruptcy Court to resolve the issue of the 
source of the funds used to purchase the motor vehicles. 
On balance, we conclude that the District Court order 
appealed from is not final under section 158(d). 
 




Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
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